Great discussion. This proposal makes a lot of sense. Thanks to everyone who worked tirelessly to prepare it.
It seems that making the tokenomics really work is going to be a multi-step process. This is an excellent first step. Well done.
When can we expect to take a vote?
At the end of the day, 30% is a great offer. Committee also could have proposed less and therefore, the last three months shouldnât be an issue and especially not in the light of âgiving yourself money retroactivelyâ. Congrats to all involved.
You neeed to consider the difference between
a) staking for 3 years to gain higher rewards with the intent to unstake early, and
b) staking for the shorter period from the beginning.
Letâs take your example. Someone stakes for 3 years to get 30% APR, then unstakes after 1 year. So, he made approx. 3% that year. If, however, you would have staked for 1 year from the beginning, you would have made 10% that year.
Therefore, there shouldnât be an economical incentive for staking longer just to receive a higher APR.
Thanks, Ororo 
. Yeah, I obviously missed the other component, i.e. opportunity cost 
, like @magicmike also explained.
This is a solid solution. Those of us who staked a huge bunch of SOV on the first day still have some minor wounds to lick, but the argument about precedent is very fair. A forward-looking mentality is the right approach.
Looks like a good proposal to me, fair and balanced.
Thanks to the team for pulling the SIP together and addressing the voluntary stakers concerns.
Very much in favour of this; and should it come to pass, will be happy to stake the entirety of my earned liquidity (40+ SOV) for the maximum possible duration after unlocking.
Great move toward much more staking reward, but it looks to me still LP (any pair) gives more SOV reward than staking
I may be wrong but currently stakers get a portion of the fees earned from trading on the platform. Does this include a portion of fees earned from swaps? If no, I thought that was one thing that was discussed and what is currently done with those fees?
I believe that is something in the works, but has not yet been implemented. The code is being investigated for updating and simultaneously discussing amounts and percentages. I think SushiSwap model was referenced as something like .05% fee to stakeholders and the remaining 0.25% to LPâs.
Donât think anything is finalized yet.
Editorâs note: The title and body of the OP have been updated with the correct SIP number, previously was noted as SIP-0021 and updated to the correct SIP-0024.
Good point!
Beside temporary incentives, Iâd also love to setup a clear path going forward with swapping fees in this SIP.
It strikes me that this question - whether the staking reward can be applied retrospectively - could itself be the subject matter of another SIP
Not the scope of this SIP.
I agree that having the rewards UI up beforehand would have been ideal. That said, I also agree with @magicmike that the big picture is important here - setting the right precedence is more important than licking the sores of every member possible (actually, this proposal is already seeking to do that, in a way).
Also, Day 1 holders also get to enjoy the capital gains associated with Day 1, no? For those who go in (anything) Day 1, uncertainty should be expected. And it is up to the individualâs conviction whether to stay the course or change it and accept whatever the consequence. And on the bright side, wow you have 515 SOV!!
Is the vote tomorrow July 12th?
yes; i posted the false date.
Point 3. of the description states:
âGrant the Exchequer (based on the analysis of user / usage data gathered during the program) the authority to cancel, or extend the incentive program for additional 3 month intervals, until such time as the Exchequer determines such incentives are no longer meaningful.â
To my reading, this opens up the possibility that a user would stake for a period (eg. 3 years) under the expectation that the rewards would continue for the entire length of their stake. However, with the current wording, it would appear that if the exchequer did not renew the program, that the rewards would cease.
I therefore have proposed changed language which would prevent this from happening. I have proposed the addition:
âThe incentives offered upon staking will survive changes introduced by the Exchequer at a later date. A staked position that would, for example, earn 30% based on the incentive structure that existed upon creation of the stake lock-up, should continue to earn that 30% until the stake lock-up expires.â
The pull-request can be found here: Proposed clarification to Incentive Payouts by YagoBit ¡ Pull Request #26 ¡ DistributedCollective/SIPS ¡ GitHub
Yago, is the change your proposing to clarify wording but still reflect the original SIP intent or are you proposing a new change to the original structure?
Being able to lock-in a 30% APY for 3 years vs being able to lock-in a 30% APY for as long as the program lasts (which was what I thought) is a huge difference. The former is quite generous, so no complaints here.
Put another way my understanding is now that the Exchequer can determine the date this program ends, but the script disbursing rewards still runs at minimum until that last date + 3 years to account for anyone that max staked on that final day the program ends?
I agree with this proposition. You canât make a solid decision on staking for 3 years with the rewards being at the discretion of the Exchequer for the entire 3 years. As is, you would have to inform prospective users of this detail before they stake, which would likely be an unattractive variable.
If the SIP were accepted as is, then a term would have to be included that if the Exchequer cancels the incentive program, stakers then have the choice to cancel their stake.