Hi core team,
If we are trying decentralise Sovryn, wouldn’t you want more and more people to buy Sovryn? Not buy an OG token?
If we want to decentralise Sovryn, then wouldn’t a better idea be, that the founders lock up 50% of their Sovryn permanently in a separate wallet, where they can’t it vote, or be sold? (Net benefit of some deflation as well)
The bonding curve means that demand for OG translates into demand for SOV.
I think the founders should vote. Who is more informed and motivated than the people who are deeply involved?
For sure, the founders should vote, but if we want true decentralised governance then we should look to dilute some of the pre-mined power (which is catch 22 because the founders deserve all the success for what they have created)
All this expansion is great, but this idea feels great at a market cap of a billion not a 100 million. Anyway just my two cents. I would be happy with limit orders and perp swaps, rather than divert efforts to this.
If SOV governance overrules the sub-protocol voting, then that’s just another reason to NOT have a separate sub-protocol governance token.
Added complexity, when it isn’t needed is a detriment to onboarding.
Diminished/Divisible utility for a governance token(s) is a detriment to token value, therefore community.
How does the Sovryn Core contributors not see this?
Honestly, it’s frustrating you guys have to make this so complicated.
SOV needs 100% utility on the SOV platform.
As much usecase as possible.
@Czero Sovryn is not a single dapp. It is a platform with many dapps. In that way it is more similar to a Layer 1, like Ethereum, than to a dapp like uniswap.
So yes, that will get complicated. The only way that I can see to keep things less complicated is to do less things. That is a possible path - build just an exchange. However, I don’t think that can be nearly as impactful or successful.
For reasons that I have explained above, I think that requires more than one token, over time it may mean many many tokens. Each one of which is like a product in itself.
So the Sovryn platform as a whole had an issue with token utility a few months back. Users of the protocol and members of this community were concerned of the lack of use case for the SOV token. Without utility, the token is worthless.
How will you fund operations over the next few years if the SOV token continues to drop in value (relative to sats or $)? Let’s consider the value of SOV now, thru the eyes of the true Oracle, the Market:
TOTAL1 has recovered up to it’s previous ATH in May. Local top at -5.56% from previous ATH
TOTAL2 is fairing better at -3.23% from its previous ATH.
btc isn’t doing as well as many of the leaders in TOTAL2, at -18.35%
SOV is doing even worse, at -77.35% v. btc | -60.7% v. xusd
…and now you want to create a NEW token to further dilute the utility of the already under performing SOV token?
This is concerning.
IF I were to look only at the charts, with no knowledge or exposure to the weekly and often daily updates that the Sov core contributors provide to the community, I would definitely think that the Sovryn project was a cash grab, because looking at the charts, that’s the image that’s presented.
Don’t get me wrong, I believe in you guys and love using the protocol and believe that decentralising finance and power is the way forward…
But you want to introduce a new token when factually it would serve as a detriment to your community…
Really?
Hi!
I’ve made this drawing in case it might help, in which I imagine the coexistence of SOV, future subprotocol tokens, and my degree of membership in them.
Option A would be a situation where the subprotocols would have no life of their own, because they would be developments within Sovryn.
Option B is a situation where the sub-protocols are independent of Sovryn. I can choose to be part of Sovryn, or not. And also to be part of the sub-protocols or not. I have freedom of choice.
Would the proposed system be anything like option C? Somehow, as a sov holder, in addition to indirectly participating in the results of all the sub-protocols, I can also increase my exposure to the ones I am particularly interested in.
Thanks @lactarius these are super helpful graphics and I think really help illustrate the point. C is what I think we can and should achieve.
I agree. Again, not opposed to the new token before we fully flush it out, but this project is so small right now. Sure, lots of features, but so many things still missing like easy offramps and listing other coins/tokens (we heard this was already ready to go, let’s get more coins to attracted more users and fees).
We’ve had one outside OG sale. One, and that didn’t go well. I got tokens but my girlfriend who staked fully from day one with Origin SOV got nothing. If we spin this into it’s own thing, let’s do it after more successes and not be distracted like we are in the big leagues. We aren’t net. Great tech and future, but not there yet.
I do truly believe in this project, I am a genesis SOV buyer, but this feels like a distraction to getting things right with what has been started. Once we get to multiple OG sales we can look to specialize. A SIP or two a month shouldn’t make the case to need specialization yet.
Also, I still don’t understand how this doesn’t dilute the value of my SOV. Unless OG was fully airdropped like a stock-split or corporate spin-off. But again, after some successes and getting things more mature in the ecosystem that has such a great start, but clearly isn’t there yet.
I have read the proposal
1.5 years vesting with 2 month cliff is too long
especially in this stage of the cycle
sovryn vesting was 10months
how can you almost double it for a launchpad token
imo 10% unlock at TGE and vesting for 12 months is the max.
Also as per other launchpads, we should have tiers for the origin platform, i.e. X amount staked is entitled to a guranteed allocation of X.
I would tend to agree with you on this…what would you say if in turn for new tokens and governance rights, the new tokens give up rewards to the SOV token in a more skewed ratio.
Thank you for insights @yago! I remain unconvinced by your arguments. I will focus on the fragmentation point here (I hope the others reply on the other points).
If the main problem that sub-protocols solve is social scalability, I think this falls short as justification. That problem is in the current stage purely hypothetical: we are a small community, there is currently no such problem. Healthy governance requires a critical mass of active members, able to argue, and with diverse views - I think we are even far from an optimal size in the total Sovryn community, we need larger, not smaller decision making groups. A sub-community is highly premature.
I’m also not convinced that a sub-community gives more focus and depth in the governance, on the contrary. What is launched on Origins, might have impact on the AMM pools, and other functionalities. Cannot have blinkered decisions about launches, precisely need the Sovrynauts to be wide-eyed and decide on the basis of the entire protocol.
You observe:
These are indeed two well-known opposing pulls on any governance system. But the suggestion that subprotocols will help conflates communication and voting power. When the community grows and there emerges a sea of voices within which it becomes harder to make one’s view count, we need to separate two issues: (1) making one’s voice heard in the communication and discussion (the deliberation), and (2) making one’s views count in terms of impact (decisions made). When it comes to communication, a sub-protocol doesn’t help; you need good focused communication channels for this (and that we have already, here on the Forum for now). If we are talking, not about communication, but about having one’s view count in terms of decision making, this growing social mass in the community is precisely what creates the incentive to obtain more SOV: to rise above it in terms of impact demands more SOV. SOV is itself already the solution to social scalability (in the sense of individual power over decision making), there is always a smaller group that has more SOV than the others, and so have more of their individual views heard. I think the abstract tension is already resolved by the basic principles of a governance token, and doesn’t apply in any further deep ways.
Totally agree I think that founders should be allowed to vote but I also hope that they are extra-sensitive to the general sentiment. There is currently a ton of cerebral power + info centralized in the dev team / founders, and this translates to a rhetorical overweight that can trample any pushback. I guess any parent can sympathize: as parent, you have the decision making power, as well as the info and rhetorical overweight to rationalize any decision made as parent, but this can create blind spots and hence calls for restraint and taking extra care in listening to the ill-expressed uninformed opinions of your kid, their ill-expressed and simple views might just be right :-).
I fully agree with these statements.
If there becomes a need for sub-protocol governance due to social inequity or some other defined/undefined reason, steps should be taken to help secure the integrity, legitimacy and functionality of the entire Sovryn ecosystem.
Pre-optimizing this at such an early stage could prove as a detriment to the entire project due to added complexity and poor tokenomics. People involved and excited about Cryptocurrency are so, because of their interest in several things, mostly I would believe it’s Yield.
If higher quality tokenomics leads to more adoption and more adoption leads to more freedom across the globe, it is in the Sovryn community’s best interest to improve the SOV tokenomics to the highest degree possible.
Launching sub-protocol tokens at this early stage would serve as a detriment to the entire project and it’s adoption curve.
It’s a really interesting concept and I have just spent more time reading through John Light’s post on sub protocols / bonding curves and the further information linked there.
What is the proposal on the governance framework of how the relationship and veto would work between the SOV Bitocracy and the Origins Bitocracy – what specifically needs to be escalated to higher governance and how would the Veto work? Is the Origins Bitocracy contract (and future launches) somehow subservient to the SOV one for Veto’s to be enforceable?
Would this governance framework flow through to future projects:
SOV Bitocracy >>>> Origins Bitocracy >>>> Project XYZ
Or once launched:
SOV Bitocracy >>>> Origins Bitocracy
SOV Bitocracy >>>> Project XYZ
Does the above apply for revenue share from future Origin launches as well or would it operate separately:
SOV Bitocracy >>>> Project XYZ
Origins Bitocracy >>>> Project XYZ
In the draft SIP it says “Initial Revenue Distribution” implying it could change - I assume fee share changes that impact SOV stakers would have to come back to the SOV Bitocracy for a vote?
How about the bonding curve reserve ratio, would this be fixed at 39.2% or variable and if changed who gets to vote for that change?
In future project launches on Origins is there going to be a minimum revenue distribution to SOV / bonding curve requirement set by the SOV Bitocracy? Are we saying all future launches should have a SOV in a bonding curve or will they use Origins as the asset and its pyramided up?
I understand that I am talking about an unknown future project beyond Origins here and there are a lot of variables. But if the launches, revenue agreements and risk analysis are being delegated to the Origins sub protocol its useful to know if there is a planned SOV framework.
What is the need for the SOV treasury to provide the 100k SOV to the bonding curve when there are already two programmatic sales providing SOV? Rather than reducing the SOV treasury by this amount why not amend the sales to cover the bonding curve requirement or set a lower requirement?
Hi all,
In yesterday’s call I could sense a mixed energy of fear and excitement regarding Origin to become a subprotocol of Sovryn.
Subprotocol represents a delicious idea and is no more than the application of the subsidiarity principle to digital rights management allowed by blockchain technology.
In other words, it would allow decisions to be taken as closely as possible from the subject matter.
It is in my opinion the most advanced way to scale a DAO where liquid sovereignty is freely distributed to specific initiatives on satisfying “targeted community needs”. I am widely in favor of it.
Origin is in my sense a “targeted community need” and a key feature of the Sovryn ecosystem. It aims at bootstrapping projects to gravitate around Sovryn, and by doing so, it will increase the value of the whole ecosystem.
Therefore, it makes perfect sense for Origin to be submitted as the 1st subprotocol as it will bootstrap a substantial change by itself.
The change is substantial because if adopted, it would allow sovereignty to be distributed into various subprotocols. Such distribution could become a risk where a subprotocol decides through its own bitocracy to secede from Sovryn.
The unknown impact of such an event does drastically increases the risks to participating in Sovryn.
As a result, Sovryn’s duty is to mitigate that risk in order to serve its best interests.
A seemingly desirable way to mitigate the risk of witnessing a subprotocol to secede from Sovryn against Sovryn own’s will would be to grant Sovryn some sort of veto on decisions made by subprotocols.
In exchange and by application of the subsidiarity principle, subprotocols would preserve their right to initiate change by submitting the desired change to Sovryn’s bitocracy.
If this idea resonate with you we could then try to answer the following questions in a formal SIP:
Such SIP would open Sovryn to a whole new set of predictable opportunities resulting in the diminution of:
1- risk for Sovryn to slowly be robbed of its own sovereignty by subprotocols deciding to migrate to other ecosystems; and
2- risks for individuals participating in Sovryn not knowing what other existing part of Sovryn will be proposed as subprotocol.
Once these points answered and some predictibility injected into Sovryn’s ecosystem, we will be able to quickly benefit from subprotocols such as Origin and other ones as we will gain in effectiveness by following a clear framework to build subprotocols.
Thanks all for taking the time to read this post and stay sovryn.
When it comes to Origins, I could assure you that the governance will be like this:
SOV Bitocracy > Origins Bitocracy
When it comes to other Sovryn Subprotocol, though the sale happens in Origins, it is still a subprotocol of Sovryn, and not Origins. So, the Governance will be like:
SOV Bitocracy > Project XYZ
When it comes to external project, that is completely dependent on that project owner.
Again the answer is similar, if it is about Origins, or any other sub protocol of Sovryn, a part of the revenue will be going to Sovryn itself.
Bonding Curve reserve ratio changes based on buy and sell. And it will be a free market, so the higher the buy, the higher the reserve ratio gets. The higher the sell, the lower the reserve ratio gets. Origins will try to make the reserve ratio higher based on the revenue.
If you look at tokenomics, the 100K SOV will help to increase the reserve ratio to up to around 39% from 35%
Sovryn Bitocracy has a veto right on all the votes done in Origins Bitocracy through a system we already have in the Bitocracy Smart Contract. So, if all the voting done is right, there is no need for any action from the Sovryn Bitocracy, but when some wrong decision is taken, Sovryn Bitocracy can overthrow that decision.
About being fair, it’s up to the Sovryn Community to vote whether they want to veto or not, and the Origins Bitocracy will be built in such a way that it gives enough time for the Sovryn Bitocracy to take the necessary steps.
Thanks for the responses.
I think this is an important point and just want to clarify. Any future sub protocally of Sovryn launched through Origins will potentially have a revenue split between Sovryn AND Origins? After the project is launched this is how Origins will continue to accrue future revenue, however Origins will have no Bitocracy oversight over the project straight after launch?
This is not an area that I am overly familiar with so sorry if Im just not understanding. From reading the referance material John Light linked to it says this:
The Reserve Ratio represents a fixed ratio between the Continuous Token’s total value (total supply × unit price) and the value of its Reserve Token balance. This ratio will be held constant by the Bancor Formula as both the Reserve Token balance and the Continuous Token’s total value (a.k.a. ‘market cap’) fluctuate with buys and sells.
Is the Sovryn implimentation of this being done in a different way if the ratio is variable?
My question is more why the need. Why not have it at 10% or 50 % or raise any additional required from the programatic sales to move from 35% to 39%.
Thank you for the answer. I am glad to read that Sovryn bitocracy is planned to have a veto.
Now, I would like to understand the following:
How is the veto implemented? Is it through the allocation of token or through another mechanism.
How is Sovryn guaranteed that the right to veto will stand for ever? If the veto is insured by the allocation of token how do we know that the voting power of Sovryn will never be diluted ?
How the process of veto can be initiated?
This is mainly why I suggest to have a pre-SIP organizing the whole subprotocol framework (beyond Origin) to have these critical points answered in advance.
Unless all of the above veto matter has already been decided and written somewhere?
Thanks in advance!
