The method you propose is most likely to work with a community like ours presently is… small, engaged, informed, etc. Just like comparing small hippie communes (like the one my parents met on, hahah) to national elections… our community will face all of the same considerations here that the founding fathers faced and more. We don’t want to just build for what works with our present community, but we want to iterate in a success-proof direction. I use this conceptualization tool, to make long term decisions where I simply ask, “What happens if I achieve all of my goals? What happy accidents does it create?” You know? If my project grows from a few thousand users, to millions of users, how does the scale impact the culture, not just the server capacity and code security, but the community security. I know we’re already trying to think this way, but this is where we do need to do the deeper work of structuring the code to preemptively accommodate the answers to those questions.
So it’s important that we have the deep conversation about the optimal structure for representative democracy. In crypto, we don’t generally think of delegates as “politicians”, but I think that will evolve over time. Eventually all of the corruption and bullshit that applies to our regular parasitic politicians, can potentially apply to our delegates. I’m just inviting us to move slowly in this consideration and to develop some proposed solutions to bypass some of the structural problems which might accelerate the reduction in governance participation, the arbitrary delegation of votes for most staking profit, and even delegates massing big blocks of voting power to literally SELL to the highest bidder. We haven’t seen a ton of this sort of stuff transpire in crypto yet, but I’m certain that we will. I would like to hear a lot of input on this topic from everyone right now. It’s pretty important guys.
I actually stopped by here today because I was having some questions about voting power and stakin duration. I just increased my SOV stake period by a year for 112 SOV… from 1 year to 2. UI said it would increase voting power over 1,000, but I only went from like 6300 to 6700 (really rough approximation could be way off here). Perhaps the UI is still delayed in updating my new voting power.
I also noticed on the UI for adding a new stake, the voting power calculation takes a few seconds to update and populate after changing variables. It was long enough that I started drafting a bug report before it finally did update. So I’m wondering if I should just chill because there’s some work going on on the governance backend or something? I’m trying to get the specifics on it. I’m over in the Sovryn Discord asking about it a bit. It’s important to me since I’m a Sovryn delegate.
I want to optimize my voting power. But it really doesn’t seem like there’s that much of a voting power percentage gain when going from 1 year to 3 year stake period. Just increased my voting from like 6300 to 7000. Seems sort of negligible. Perhaps the time-weighted voting equation can be illustrated in a way that helps us refine it to optimize the behaviors we want to see on Sovryn?
So let’s create a rubric for what constitutes a high caliber delegate. Then we can find ways to incentivize those specific KPIs? So abstain votes could be detrimental to this score, longer stake duration would DRAMATICALLY increase this score or the voting power by x factors? Could be exploit potential with this as well, so of course there are thousands of considerations I’m unaware of, so just trying to help shape the code that defines the parliamentary governance in the most sovereign way possible.